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Recent Cases
INSURANCE-MUTUAL

BENEFIT COMPANY-ISSUANCE OF POLICY IN
BENEFICIARY OUTSIDE STATUTORY CATEGORY

FAVOR OF

Phelps v. Life Benefit, Inc.'
Defendant is a mutual assessment life insurance company organized and
existing under the laws of South Dakota. 2 In 1934, one Roy B. Phelps purchased

1.
2.

291 N. W. 919 (S. D. 1940).
The statutes are now substantially S. D. CODE (1939) c. 31.19.
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from the defendant company a policy in which the beneficiary was described as
"his fiancee, Alice Krueger, if living, otherwise to the insured's estate." One
of the statutes under which defendant company operated provided that no
policy should be issued in favor of any beneficiary other than a husband, wife,
relative, legal representative, heir, or legatee of the insured member, and that
any policy issued in violation of the statute should be void.3 The insured predeceased the named personal beneficiary. Plaintiff, his son and administrator,
brings this action to recover on the policy. From an adverse judgment, the
insurance company appeals. HELD: The policy is void and the judgment must
be reversed. (One judge dissents without opinion.)
As a general rule, an ordinary insurance company may incorporate in its
4
policies almost any provisions not contrary to public policy or specific statute.
But mutual insurance companies are apt to be more closely circumscribed. Either by statute or by the constitution or by-laws of the benefit association itself, the liberal rule allowing the insured to designate whom he pleases as a
beneficiary is abrogated or restricted, and in nominating a beneficiary he is
commonly confined in his choice to certain persons or classes of persons such as
father, mother, wife, children, relatives or dependents.5 Knotty problems frequently arise as to whether a certain individual falls within any of the authorized categories. 6 That question is not raised here, however, since it is conceded
that the fiancee was not within the designated classes prescribed by statute.
Admitting this, the only question of importance is whether the policy is valid or
not for any purpose. Urged as controlling was an earlier South Dakota case in
which the facts were largely similar, except that after the issuance of the policy
the insured executed a will in which the beneficiary of the policy was named a
legatee. The court in that case held for the beneficiary on the ground that the
insured's action in making her a legatee qualified her as a beneficiary under the
statute, and this even though she was not a proper party beneficiary at the time

3. S. D. Comsp. LAWS (1929) § 9358, now substantially S. D. CODE (1939)
§ 31.1906, which reads as follows: "No mutual assessment life, health, accident,
or casualty company operating under statutes of this state shall issue any certificate of membership or policy to any person under the age of fifteen years or
over the age of sixty years, nor unless the beneficiary under such certificate shall
be husband, wife, relative, legal representative, heir, or legatee of such insured
member and any certificate issued or assignment made in violation of this section shall be void. . .
4. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 78 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935), cart.
denied, 296 U. S. 635 (1935).
5. Bennett v. Modern Woodmen of America, 52 Cal. App. 581, 199 Pac.
343 (1921); Marsh v. Supreme Council American Legion of Honor, 149 Mass.
512, 21 N. E. 1070 (1889); Brierly v. Equitable Aid Union, 170 Mass. 218,
48 N. E. 1090 (1898); Sanger v. Rothschild, 123 N. Y. 577, 26 N. E. 3 (1890).
6. For instance, may an affianced wife be said to be within the category
of "dependents"? That she may, see McCarthy v. New England Order of Protection, 153 Mass. 314, 26 N. E. 866 (1891); Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Noel,
34 Okla. 596, 126 Pac. 787 (1912). Contra: Alexander v. Parker, 144 11. 355,
33 N. E. 183 (1893).
7. Christenson v. El Riad Temple, 37 S. D. 68, 156 N. W. 581 (1916).
The court also distinguished on the facts Oliphant v. American Health & Accident Ass'n, 147 Iowa 656, 126 N. W. 806 (1910).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/2
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of the issuance of the policy. The court in the principal case, evincing a less
liberal attitude, distinguished the two situations on their basic facts and on the
further ground that in Christenson v. El Riad Temple,8 the insurer did not
question the validity of the policy, but paid the money into court pending a
determination of the claims of the beneficiary and the heirs of the deceased insured. In view of the fact that the policy in the instant case named an alternative
beneficiary, conceivably the court might have interpreted the contract as ineffective with regard to the improperly named beneficiary, but good as to the
other.0 However, the difficulty with such a position is that here the alternative
beneficiary was not squarely within the statutory categories either.' 0 Inasmuch
as the statute not only provided that no policy should be issued covering beneficiaries other than those named, but also expressly declared that a policy so issued should be void, the court's decision to that effect clearly seems proper.",
Likewise justified is the conclusion that no theory of estoppel or waiver can
validate a policy otherwise void. 12 Any other result would effectually write
the statute in question off the books.13
Western Reserve University Law School

E. D. PHELPS

8. 37 S. D. 68, 156 N. W. 581 (1916).
9. This was precisely the ground upon which the court proceeded in Oliphant v. American Health & Accident Ass'n, 147 Iowa 656, 126 N. W. 806
(1910).
10. The alternative beneficiary was stated to be the "insured's estate".
Under the South Dakota law, "legal representative" is about the only statutory
category which could be said to embrace such a beneficiary. But to bring the
named beneficiary within that classification would involve a construction not
at all seemly.
11. Where, in contravention of statute, mutual benefit policies were issued to persons over sixty years of age, they have also been held void: Reed v.
Missouri Mutual Ass'n, 5 S. W. (2d) 675 (Mo. App. 1928); McNairy v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 114 S. W. (2d) 156 (Mo. App. 1938). The South Dakota statute also included a restriction of this sort (supra, n. 3). As supporting the
general proposition that an improper designation of beneficiary is inoperative
and void, see authorities cited in 2 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929)
§307, n. 12.
12. The position is clearly pointed out in Riley v. Missouri Mutual Ass'n,
278 S. W. 780 (Mo. App. 1926), where the court ruled that the association could
not be held by waiver for what it could not assume by direct contract. An analogy may be noted in the case of infants' contracts. According to the general
rule, an infant lacks capacity to make valid contracts, and it is commonly held
that his representations that he is of age do not operate to clothe him with a
capacity by estoppel. In other words, one cannot lift himself by his own bootstraps. Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40 (Mass. 1853). A distinction is.
also commonly, and, it is believed, properly made between restrictions on classes.
of beneficiaries which are imposed by mutual association constitutions or bylaws, and those imposed by statute. The former might well be said to be for
the benefit of the insurer alone. The company is not inherently incapable of
insuring in favor of other classes of beneficiaries, but it has merely determined
by its voluntary action that it will not do so. Thus, where it knowingly issues;
a policy in favor of an improper beneficiary and accepts premium payments, there
is ample ground for applying principles of waiver and/or estoppel. On the other
hand, where the restriction is imposed by statute, it may with equal cogencybe said that there is a basic lack of capacity which the principles suggested:
cannot cure or supply.

307.

13.

See 2 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929)

The result reached by the court in the instant case does not seem
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BILLS AND NOTES-INSTRUMENT PAYABLE TO FICTITIOUS PAYEE

Security Savings Bank v. First National Bank"
The Bromwell Wire Goods Company purchased goods from Mitchell Brothers. Invoices were received and sent to the superintendent, who checked and
returned the invoices with bill of lading attached. Harner, the secretary-treasurer, made the appropriate bookkeeping entries, drew the proper checks on the
plaintiff, Michigan City Bank, payable to Mitchell Brothers, signed them, and
then sent them to the president for signature. After signing, the president
placed them in a certain basket on the desk of one Jones for mailing. On April
6, 1931, Harner took one of these checks from the basket. Later, he drew, and
the president unsuspectingly signed, a second check on the same invoice, so that
Mitchell Brothers was paid, and the taking was not detected. By January 11,
1933, a total of thirty-two checks, amounting to $4547.25, was so taken.
With these checks, Harper opened an account in the Security Savings Bank of
Covington in the name of Mitchell Brothers, checks thereon to be signed by himself as secretary-treasurer. The checks deposited in this account were indorsed
by Harner, "Pay to the order of Security Savings Bank, Mitchell Brothers."
Defendant indorsed "Pay any bank or banker," and deposited the checks in the
Lincoln National Bank of Cincinnati, which sent them to the Federal Reserve
IBank of Chicago for collection. The drawee paid the checks, and upon the
fraud being discovered, sued the Covington bank to recover the amount paid.
The trial court had found as fact that when Harner made out the checks he
had no intention of stealing them, but formed that intention only when the opportunity arose. Judgment for plaintiff drawee was affirmed.
In allowing recovery by the drawee bank against a holder subsequent to the
:forged indorsement but prior to the party presenting the check and receiving
payment, the court had to work out its own theory of action. The drawee has
no action upon the implied warranties of the defendant's indorsement, which. run
only to holders. 2 Apart from the statute, a warranty is an incident of sale. The

unduly harsh. The restriction involved was a statutory one and might have
been ascertained by the insured before he purchased his policy. Moreover, there
is authority in the law for accomplishing in a valid way the result which the
insured here apparently desired to reach. See Kerr v. Crane, 212 Mass. 224, 98
N. E. 783 (1912), where the court held enforceable as a trust a promise made by
an insurance beneficiary to pay the proceeds to a third person who was himself
ineligible as a beneficiary under the statute. But see 1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
(1935) § 79, comment g. Nor does it seem likely that the insured (or his estate) will suffer any out of pocket loss by the ruling of the court. Undoubtedly,
since the policy is declared void, a quasi-contractual action would lie for a
recovery of premiums paid. And apart from this remedy, the South Dakota laws
give an express action for such a recovery. S. D. CODE (1939) § 31.0603.
1. 106 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
2. See National Bank of Rolla v. First National Bank of Salem, 141 Mo.
App. 719, 125 S. W. 513 (1910). By N. I. L. § 65 (MO. REv. STAT. 1929, § 2693),
the warranty arises from "negotiation". By N. I. L. § 30 (REV. STAT. § 2659),
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/2
"negotiation" constitutes the transferee a "holder". By N. I. L. § 66 (REv. STAT.
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drawee does not purchase the instrument; he pays it.3 The indorsement of the
party making presentation is but a receipt.
It is well settled that a drawee may recover from the party to whom he
paid it the money mistakenly paid on an instrument to which an essential indorsement had been forged.4 Defendant here was a remote party. The decision
rests upon the laudable determination to avoid circuity of action, for the drawee
could have recovered from the presenter in quasi-contract, and the latter would
have had an action over against the defendant upon his indorsement.
Defendant further urged the drawer's negligence, and alleged in any event
that the forged indorsement was immaterial to his title, in that the instrument
was payable to bearer under Section 9 (3)s of the N. I. L. The statute reads:
"The instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious . . . person, and such fact was known to the person making it so
payable." It is well settled that, for the purpose of the statute, a "fictitious person" includes a real person who is not intended to receive the check or its proceeds. 6 Controversy centers on the questions, who is "the person making it
so payable," and when is an agent's knowledge of the fact to be imputed to his
principal?
By the majority view, the "person making it so payable" is the individual
creating the check, not the principal (commonly a corporation) whose name
appears as drawer.7 This approach avoids the dilemma of imputing to the principal the agent's intent to defraud him, on the one hand, and of rendering the
statute nugatory, on the other.8 But where there are several agents, each of
whom plays an essential part in uttering the check, who is the person making
the check whose knowledge is significant?
It has been held in Missouri that "the person making it so payable" must
be the drawer, whose name appears on the check and who is responsible for its
credit.9 Since knowledge of the agent must be imputed to the drawer if the stat-

§ 2694), an unqualified indorsement runs to a "holder in due course", who, by
N. I. L. § 52 (REv. STAT. § 2680), must, of course, also be a "holder." The
definition of "holder" in N. I. L. § 191 (REv. STAT. § 2822) does not include the
drawee.
3. Many cases are collected in BRANNON'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
(6th ed. 1938) 465, 816 et seq.
4. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 287 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1841). This
is also the rule under § 23 of the N. I. L. Home Ins. Co. v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
219 Mo. App. 645, 284 S. W. 834 (1926). Other cases are collected in BRANNON'S
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 329, 330, 331.
5. M . REV. STAT. (1929) § 2638.
6. Meredith v. Pound, 92 S. W. (2d) 698 (Mo. 1936). Many cases are
collected in BRANNON'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 205 et seq.
7. Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S. W. 465
(1920); American Hominy Co. v. National Bank, 294 Ill. 223, 128 N. E. 391
(1920); Litchfield Shuttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley National Bank, 134 Tenn.
379, 183 S.W. 1006 (1915).
8. In by far the great majority of cases in which the agent intended to
make the instrument payable to a fictitious payee, he also intended to defraud
the principal who appeared as drawer.
9. American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.
W. (2d) 1034 (1933).
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ute is ever to apply to instruments of corporations, it will often be necessary to
impute to the drawer an intention to defend himself, a fiction indeed. And if
several agents participate in the transaction, the problem of whose knowledge and
intent is to be imputed to the principal is quite as difficult of solution, and must
be decided upon the same principles of commercial convenience, as the question
under the majority view of what person "makes" the instrument.
In the leading Missouri case on the subjectio a fraudulent clerk inserted fictitious names upon the payroll, to whom checks were made out by the secretary
and treasurer of the drawer. The clerk then abstracted the fraudulent items,
indorsed the names of the payees, and cashed them. In a suit against the drawee
who had charged the checks to the drawer's account, it was held that they were
not bearer instrument, the lower court arguing1 that the "persons making" the
checks were the secretary and/or treasurer, who had no knowledge of the fictitious,
character of the payees, the supreme court holding that the drawer Sash & Door
Co. "made" the check but without the knowledge of its clerk, who was not acting
within the scope of his authority when he uttered the checks. The test seems to
be, was it within the authorized discretion of the given agent to issue valid obligations of the drawer or maker? If so, his knowledge and intention will be imputed to the principal, even as to instruments drawn with intention to defraud
the principal.
An earlier Missouri case, Equitable Life Assurance Society v. National Bank
of Commerce,12 has been the subject of much controversy. A fraudulent insurance
agent procured the issuance of a life policy on a fictitious person, faked the proof
of death, and obtained from the home office a check payable to a fictitious beneficiary. This check was regarded by the court as a bearer instrument, the drawer
being said to be "estopped" to set up the fact that it was payable to order. Very
just criticism1s of the reasoning of the opinion-the principle of N. I. L. 9 (3) is
founded upon the fact that the maker intends the instrument to be payable to
the person actually indorsing it in the fictitious name, not upon a theory of estoppel which cannot be spelled out in terms of representation and reliance--resulted in perhaps too hasty condemnation of the conclusion.14 A negotiable instrument is not "made" until it is delivered.'- An agent with discretionary authority
to deliver checks of the drawer 16 may be the person "making" the instrument,
or the agent whose knowledge is to be imputed to the principal, as truly as the

10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
25 S. W. (2d) 545 (Mo. App. 1930).
181 S. W. 1176 (Mo. App. 1916).
BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (3rd ed. 1920) 35, enprinted

6th ed. 222.
14. Ibid. In the 6th edition of that book (p. 222) it is said that the Equitable case was overruled by the American Sash & Door Co. case. On the contrary, the result was inferentially approved. 332 Mo. 98, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034
(1933).
15. N. I. L. § 16, Mo.REv. STAT. (1929) § 2645.
16. Whether, in the Equitable case, such authority existed is a question offact and the law of agency.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss4/2
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agent signing or countersigning. Indeed, where there is discretionary power in
several agents, the one to sign, the other to deliver, it might be argued that only
the one performing the last step necessary to issuance "made" the check. It
would be somewhat more difficult, at least under the statement of the American
Sash & Door Co. case, to say that only his knowledge should be imputed to the
principal.
In the very recent case of Globe Indemnity Co. v. First National Bank,17
knowledge of the fictitious character of the payee was held by one officer of
the drawer, who prepared and signed the checks, but not by the second officer
who countersigned them. They were held to be bearer instrumentsI s the knowledge of the one agent being imputed to the principal, as he was acting within
his authority in executing the checks.
By these standards, the instant case seems sound. The court found that
Harner had no specific intention of stealing the checks when he made them out.
There was no knowledge of the fictitious character of the payee at the making,
because at that time it was not fictitious. Even if it be assumed that the knowledge of the agent who makes up the checks but does not sign them is to be
imputed to the principal, which quaere, in the instant case such knowledge
was not entertained. When he again acquired the checks and formed his intention that the payee should be his alter ego, he had no discretionary authority
as to delivery, could not be considered the person making the check, and his knowledge could not be imputed to his principal.
RICHARD H. FLEISCHAKER

17. 133 S. W. (2d) 1066 (Mo. App. 1939).
18. P. & G. Card & Paper Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bank, 172 N. Y. Supp. 688
(Sup. Ct. 1918); Hackensack Trust Co. v. Hudson Trust Co., 189 N. Y. Supp.
36 (1921), 119 Misc. 689, 197 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1922), aff'g, 202 N. Y. Supp. 928
(1923).
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